

PROJECT SUMMARY

Overview:

My research examines the political and legal interactions of Institutionally Disruptive Companies as they enter markets or release products around the world. An Institutionally Disruptive Company is a company that introduces a product, service, or provision method that presents a high level of legal and political uncertainty regarding the current and future legal status of the company or its new product offering; such uncertainty is most often due to technological change and novelty. Thus, Institutionally Disruptive Companies are the upstream actors in the STEM field that actually deploy technological developments within the market. The institutional uncertainty at the time of their entry or launch is resolved through interaction with political and legal actors during disruptive bargaining interactions between competing companies, political and legal elites, as well as society more broadly. Examining the entries or launches of these companies elucidates the role of law and politics in the integration or suppression of technological developments or the novel deployment of extant technologies.

The research funding provided through an NSF DDRIG from the STS section would provide funding to conduct interview and case study research in order to test theories that constitute an integral component of my dissertation research. Interviews would be conducted with strategists from institutionally disruptive companies that have sought to deploy institutionally disruptive technologies, including those that have successfully or unsuccessfully established themselves within their intended jurisdictions of operation.

Intellectual Merit:

The project will test an original theory generated through the development and refinement of a theoretical model. It will also provide a test of the Platform Power theory developed by Thelen and Culpepper (2019.) Additionally, the research will contribute to the generation of knowledge regarding the upstream frontier of STEM, the ways in which politics, law, and economics contribute to and constrain the shaping of the future, as well as the coevolution of society and technology. This will be accomplished through explicating and investigating the economic decisions of key actors in these interactions as well as the constraints on the actual deployment of new and institutionally disruptive technologies. In doing so it will also contribute to pressing debates regarding the impact of technological deployments on society, such as the concerns with the erosion of privacy addressed by Zubloff (2019) and others.

Broader Impacts:

Broader impacts of the project include the generation of knowledge that may influence public policy making as well as private corporate strategies. The knowledge generated would also be useful to nongovernmental organizations or social movements seeking to protect and preserve labor rights, privacy rights, as well as human rights as ongoing transitions within 21st century economy and society challenge the protections, stability, and benefits that were established during the 20th. Additionally, the Co-PI, Thomas C. Elliott, has a demonstrated history of engaging in synergistic activities. The synergistic activities that may result from the project with broader impacts would be the sharing of the knowledge through published works as well as through engagement with actors in the private and public sector.

Q: Why do Institutionally Disruptive Companies comply with bans or prohibitions in some cases, but not within others?

My research examines the political and legal interactions of *Institutionally Disruptive Companies* as they enter markets or release products around the world. An Institutionally Disruptive Company is a company that introduces a product, service, or provision method that presents a high level of legal and political uncertainty regarding the current and future legal status of the company or its new product offering; such uncertainty is most often due to technological change and novelty. Thus, Institutionally Disruptive Companies are the upstream actors in the STEM field that actually deploy technological developments within the market. The institutional uncertainty at the time of their entry or launch is resolved through interaction with political and legal actors during disruptive bargaining interactions between competing companies, political and legal elites, as well as society more broadly. Examining the entries or launches of these companies elucidates the role of law and politics in the integration or suppression of technological developments or the novel deployment of extant technologies.

Prime examples of recent Institutionally Disruptive Companies are Uber as well as other app-based service networks; there are also numerous examples of established companies or professions releasing Institutionally Disruptive Products, such as mass-market eyewear with surveillance capabilities or the use of psilocybin or other controlled substances for therapeutic purposes. These cases provide generalizable insights into the political, legal, and social dynamics of introducing new *Institutionally Disruptive Technologies*. While there are several historical precedents from which we may generalize, my dissertation research will primarily emphasize more recent examples, including the global spread of Transportation Network Companies.

My dissertation questions why some of these companies have been more successful than others or why they have encountered more success in certain jurisdictions while introducing Institutionally Disruptive Technologies. In doing so, my dissertation will present a novel theoretical and conceptual framework to elucidate the political and institutional constraints as well as the strategic opportunities that impact how businesses may deploy such technologies. The dissertation will also clarify the constraints faced by regulators or incumbent companies as they seek to fend off competitors or maintain institutional continuity. The dissertation will contribute to interdisciplinary debates within STS as well as within Social Science; within Political Science it will contribute to the literature on Institutional Strength and Institutional Dynamics.

Political, legal, economic, and social change interact with technological change to open windows that I refer to as *Disruptive Opportunity Spaces*. These contingent spaces of legal and political uncertainty may be seized by companies that seek to deploy new technologies or new permutations of those technologies as they seek to legalize their innovative new product or service. The theoretical and conceptual framework focuses on attempts to accomplish legalization rapidly, but I also account for the relationship between these strategies and more gradual strategies of fostering support for a technology or product; examples of this dynamic are the strategies employed by companies to provide THC infused products during the initial period after legalization for recreational purposes in some contexts.

Understanding the politics of Institutionally Disruptive Companies, whether the technologies they deploy are novel or something that has been a component of a more prolonged movement, requires a broadened understanding of the links between technology and political, legal, economic, and social change. Indeed, politics are a central component of these interactions as noncompliance, contention, and political risk are key aspects of the strategies deployed by the diverse actors within these interactions. Indeed, in her research on the emergence of *Surveillance Capitalism*, Zuboff (2019) notes that the key to the success of Surveillance Capitalists has been sustained operations within lawless space and through sustained operations in the shadows as a means of reducing contention and political risk. Yet, while her analysis focuses on less transparent interactions of a specific type of Institutionally Disruptive Company, my research focuses on the more visibly noncompliant and contentious interactions between Institutionally Disruptive Companies, incumbent companies, the state, and society.

These bargaining interactions provide a lens through which one may observe the forces that channel technological developments into socially and economically productive forms as well as the forces that determine variation in the successful establishment of an Institutionally Disruptive Company within a jurisdiction. Through employing this lens, I will discuss questions regarding the role of business, science, technology, and innovation in the ongoing development and evolution of society. What responsibilities do diverse actors, such as businesses, the State, and innovators themselves have in channeling technological developments into socially beneficial forms? Additionally, what are the political and legal constraints that may inhibit the deployment of certain technologies within some jurisdictions? Most importantly, what opportunities and challenges exist for these actors as the pace of technological change hastens?

A mix of case study and interview research as well as a survey experiment will provide the empirical components of this theoretically and conceptually oriented dissertation. This proposal specifically seeks funding to support the implementation of an empirical test of one of the theories that will be a key component of the larger dissertation. The case studies contained in this component as well as within the larger dissertation will be situated within the US as well as other national contexts, including Argentina and Brazil. Combining these approaches within the dissertation will incorporate elite and nonelite perspectives as well as the perspectives of the individuals and organizations involved in launching and governing Institutionally Disruptive Technologies.

The Model

The specific component of the project for which I am seeking support from the STS NSF DDRIG regards the compliance decisions of Institutionally Disruptive Companies in response to a prohibition or ban on their operations. Specifically, I have developed a theoretical model to determine why companies choose to engage the strategy of noncompliant advocacy in response to a ban or a prohibition on their services. This involves continuing to provide a good or service in contravention of a ban or prohibition while simultaneously pursuing a legal right to operate within the jurisdiction in which the ban or prohibition is active. The engagement of the uncommon strategy of Noncompliant Advocacy has become a common situation during the international spread of TNCs as well as other Institutionally Disruptive Companies.

The key parameters of the model are the market performance of the company during the anticipated period of noncompliant advocacy, the anticipated politically induced operations costs, which may include costs due to political sanctions or due to violent attacks on the Institutionally Disruptive Company, the probability of a competitor entering the market during a period of compliance, as well as the strategic costs to advocate for a legal right. The model also accounts for the estimated market performance of the company once it successfully achieves legalization, a perception that is likely to be impacted by competitive pressures given the probability of a viable competitor usurping the market were the company to comply.

In addition to explicating the strategic determinants of the choices made by the economic actors that I analyze, the model elucidates the economic constraints that may determine the success of regulatory attempts to govern the emergence of Institutionally Disruptive Technologies, companies, and products. The competitive pressures as well as the perceived inevitability of these technologies becoming normalized leads corporate leaders as well as entrepreneurial operators to make serious decisions regarding the utility of compliance with bans or prohibitions that they expect to be temporary or potentially overcome by a competitor.

Thus, this proposal is for the purpose of funding interview and case study research into two related theories that emerge from the model. The first, proprietary security theory, stems from the implication that a company will be more likely to sustain noncompliant advocacy where it faces a strong competitive threat due to less secure intellectual property. The second and related implication is that a company may be more likely to comply if it experiences brand dominance, which allows for the expectation of a similar market performance upon legalization as a company with secure intellectual property. As such, the theories predict that an insecure company will be more likely to continue operations while pursuing a legal right to operate.

		Low Cost		High Cost	
		Brand Dominance and Intellectual Property Security			
		High	Low	High	Low
Estimated Probability of Legalization Given Popular Support	High	A NA	B NA	Ai CA	Bi NA
	Low	C CA*	D NA*	Ci CA	Di CA*

The decisions in quadrants with an * will depend upon perceptions of r^* relative to r' , the probability of legalization given a noncompliant (NA) or compliant strategy (CA), respectively.

The balancing of political and legal risk alongside economic risk also calls for the consideration of what Thelen and Culpepper (2019) refer to as *Platform Power* or consumer support. The probability of legalization may be higher if a company sustains noncompliant advocacy as it may be able to maintain and build the political support of platform users while also employing novel means of mobilizing them in service of its political and legal goals. Whereas Zuboff (2019) emphasizes the “lawless” operations of Surveillance Capitalists that take place behind the scenes or in the shadows, these theories specifically question why Institutionally Disruptive Companies might visibly defy a ban or prohibition within full view of political and legal authorities.

Incorporating a consideration of politically induced operations costs allows for the identification of a means of testing these alternatives. Platform Power ought to drive divergence in low cost cases while considerations of brand dominance or intellectual property security ought to be a primary determinant of divergence in cases with high costs to engage noncompliant advocacy.

The costs to advocate for a right during noncompliance, the enforcement decisions of local politicians as well as the potential for violent reactions, considered as the cost of noncompliant advocacy, are also pertinent and are considered as the noncompliant advocacy costs such that there are two different 2x2s; one in which costs are high and the company operates at a loss as well as another in which the market performance of the company is greater than the cost of noncompliance during a period of noncompliant advocacy, albeit potentially lower than during a period of legal operations. Thus, compliance might also occur where consumer support is high as well as where consumer support and intellectual property security are low if costs outweigh the market performance. However, a prohibition or ban may be seen as unsustainable due to the cross-cutting support of political or legal authorities, which would be more common under conditions of certainty produced through iterative interaction. Thus, there are four rival hypotheses for why the cost benefit calculation of noncompliance might be deemed higher than compliance:

1. Economic Risk Reduction

Due to insecure brand dominance or intellectual property such that a compliant strategy would induce too much economic risk.

2. Political Risk Reduction

Due to an estimated probability of legalization through a noncompliant strategy that would be higher than the estimated probability of legalization through an alternative compliant strategy. This would be due to the expectation that the Platform Power elucidated by Thelen and Culpepper as well as broader popular support could be built and mobilized more effectively during a period of noncompliant advocacy in order to reduce political risk.

3. Costless Noncompliance

Due to the low costs of noncompliant advocacy relative to the market performance achieved during a prohibition or ban.

4. Cross Cutting Support

Due to the expectation that a legal or political ban will be quickly overturned, such as in the case where a law passed by politicians is expected to be successfully overturned by the courts or vice versa. This may also include the intervention of higher-level politicians.

Methodology

The theory of brand dominance and intellectual property security as applied to IDCs is unamenable to a large n statistical test. One could choose to study the wider categories of entrepreneurial companies or tech companies in general as there are numerous datasets that allow scholars to study various aspects of corporate behavior and ordinary business politics. However, Institutionally

Disruptive Companies engage in an extraordinary form of interaction that merits special attention, despite having manifested itself less frequently. As such, I will test the theory and determine the relative weight of the alternatives through structured interviews of strategic representatives of multiple Institutionally Disruptive Companies. A structured interview will present questions regarding compliance decisions in response to prohibitions or bans within different jurisdictions at different points in time as well as through comparing similar cases with alternative outcomes. Major transportation networks have encountered similar prohibitions or bans within many different national and subnational jurisdictions, yet their responses have varied, even within the same jurisdiction. As an example, TNCs in Rio de Janeiro operated in contravention of a ban that was passed by the city council in 2016 while arguing that a legal precedent issued counter to an earlier ban from 2015 protected their right to operate (G1 Rio, 2016.)

Prior to conducting the interviews, I will create a timeline of events, including a record of the compliance decisions as observable through secondary sources. I will also code each of the jurisdictions and companies as being within quadrants A, B, C, or D (see the 4x2, above.) I will include a preliminary classification of their compliance decision as well as a preliminary classification of the noncompliant advocacy cost associated with the event. The classification will be updated after having interviewed the representatives of the companies. The companies within the sample will include operators of Transportation Network Companies, urban parking applications, home rental networks, as well as other Institutionally Disruptive Companies that have encountered bans or prohibitions during their entries or operations around the globe.

Interviewing strategists within multiple companies in order to triangulate the determinants of their decision making will allow me to identify the alternative courses of action that were considered as well as to determine whether changes in perceptions of the variables within a jurisdiction led to changes in behavior that are predicted within the model. Thus, this interview and case study approach will allow for cross sectional assessment of the theory within a sample of representative Institutionally Disruptive Companies as well as within case longitudinal analysis of the companies. The inclusion of multiple different companies is most important as a means of allowing for variation in the independent variable of interest, the intellectual property security and brand dominance of a company. The longitudinal analysis of strategic decision making within individual cases where decisions may have changed due to altered perceptions of the strategic environment will also shed light on the relative weight of the rival hypotheses.

The fellowship will enable two rounds of interviews as well as follow up research, if necessary, to triangulate causality and to resolve any contradictions from the first and second rounds of interviews. The preliminary case studies, including the creation of the timeline and the classification of cases through the engagement of secondary source research, will be complete prior to the fieldwork period. A set of formal interview questions tailored to the specific prohibitions or bans that the respective companies have encountered will be developed with the results of preliminary case study research. Cases in which a company has encountered a ban will be identified and interview participants will be questioned as to the strategic calculus behind their choices to comply or not with the regulations.

The first round of interviews will be in San Francisco where major TNCs as well as many other IDCs have their headquarters. A first round will allow for enhanced identification of interviewees

within the international sites as well as refinement of the interview questions and classifications. The second round of interviews in Argentina and Brazil will be conducted to include other international companies, local representatives of US companies, as well as to interview other actors involved in the interactions.

The case study approach employed will present an array of diagnostic case studies, including influential, pathway, and most similar case study comparisons with the cases of companies that operate within multiple jurisdictions (Gerring, 2017.) Additionally, the inclusion of other actors, such as political decision makers, workers, etc. will allow for a more contextualized presentation of the results. The diagnostic aspect will attempt to falsify the theory that brand dominance and intellectual property security, as primary determinants of the level of perceived economic risk, were a principle contributing factors in decisions to engage the strategy of noncompliant advocacy. The approach will also allow for a qualitative estimation of the relative effect of hypotheses 2 and 3 for cases in which multiple considerations drive decision making.

A participant organization will be selected according to identified membership within the class of Institutionally Disruptive Companies, most of whom have encountered prohibitions or bans. The identification strategy of the method is to test whether the predictions of the theory hold within cases where noncompliant advocacy costs are high, but the brand dominance or intellectual property security of the companies or their products vary (quadrants Ai and Bi.) A test will also be conducted to verify a theoretical implication of the Platform Power Theory presented in Thelen and Culpepper (2019;) the test of this theory involves comparing cases in low cost jurisdictions that exhibit variation in the perceived probability of legalization given popular support at the time a compliance decision is made (quadrants A and C.) The theoretical model predicts that one strategy should be dominant within low and high cost jurisdictions, but that variation should occur systematically according to whether the case fits within one or the other of the specified quadrants.

The method of interviewing companies regarding their decision making will also provide inductive insights as well as a thicker analysis of political and legal business strategy that will be included within the dissertation. Moving beyond a mere test of whether brand dominance, intellectual property security, Platform Power, and other political and legal factors guide decision makers, qualitative analysis will allow for a more nuanced presentation of the results of the study. With regard to the potential for thick analysis, a claim presented in Thelen and Culpepper (2019) will also be investigated more deeply. They claim that an implication of their theory is that jurisdictions in which regulatory authorities or courts hold sway will be jurisdictions in which the deployment of Platform Power may be less effective. However, a related implication of their theory is that this enhanced ability to engage, mobilize, and develop politically beneficial relationships with consumers ought to be part of the strategic calculus that institutionally disruptive companies perform within the political arena. Indeed, Platform Power and popular support may be seen, especially within cases for which noncompliant advocacy is predicted, as a means of overcoming the rules that courts or regulatory authorities seek to enforce.

My interviews with the strategists within these companies regarding their strategic responses to political challenges, such as a ban or prohibition, will provide a structured test of both of these implications. Have companies found that courts, regulators, as well as competitive authorities have been the most durable obstacles to their strategic goals within market governance institutions?

Have companies deliberately sought to harness Platform Power and popular support on a more frequent basis as a means of shaping regulatory systems as opposed to alternative traditional strategies, such as direct lobbying or compliance? Additionally, have they sought to do so during periods of noncompliance according to the predictions of my theoretical model? The results of this investigation will provide valuable knowledge to public and private actors, allowing the parties to these bargaining interactions to consider the economic incentives and emerging capabilities of the parties, as well as the increasingly prevalent role of broader societal actors.

The Intellectual Merit

The intellectual merit of the project stems from over two years of sustained study of these issues with a focus on more recent examples of Institutionally Disruptive Companies. During the course of this study I have developed a multidimensional conceptual and theoretical framework to understand the emerging challenges. This framework also explores the nature of the opportunities that potential Institutionally Disruptive Companies, the state, and society must account for as the pace of technological change increases. Additionally, the framework and its development are notable for combining deductive and inductive techniques in the process of theory generation. As specified above, a theoretical model was developed to generate predictions about the conditions under which these companies may select riskier economic or political strategies, specifically with regard to compliance decisions in response to political or legal prohibitions or bans. However, the model has been brought into conversation with the inductive work of other scholars; additionally, its development was guided by the conceptual framework and the knowledge that was generated through sustained study of Institutionally Disruptive Companies as well as relevant interdisciplinary literatures.

Thus, the responsive strategies component of my dissertation will expand upon the research of other scholars (Collier, et al, 2018; Thelen, 2018), most notably the theory of Platform Power (Thelen and Culpepper, 2019), while also allowing me to test original theories that I have developed. The development of the conceptual framework also builds upon the scholarship and research of technology and business scholars, such as the literature on disruptive technology and innovation (Bowsher and Christiansen 1995; Christiansen, et al, 2015.) However, while this literature focuses on the effect of an innovation within an industry, something that may occur with full legal and political certainty, the concepts of an Institutionally Disruptive Company and a Disruptive Opportunity Space emphasize the uncertainty of the company and its technology or product within the political and legal arenas, a phenomena that may increasingly characterize the introduction of new technologies.

Additionally, the larger dissertation will build upon the research of numerous scholars that have analyzed the challenges presented by technological change, such as Wajcman's assessment of automation and Zuboff's study of surveillance capitalism. In doing so, it will present an alternative perspective on the strategic challenges as well as the strategic opportunities for an increased role for the state and democratic politics within these interactions (Wajcman, 2017; Zuboff, 2019.) Both of these authors have called for a greater role of the state. Yet, Zuboff has specifically identified a trend in which the companies that she examines have retreated into the shadows when they expect to encounter political and legal opposition. The companies that she studies employ speed and secrecy as primary tactics, strategies that are similarly beneficial to nascent

Institutionally Disruptive Companies. Yet, there does appear to be a double movement in the making. The externalities of established and nascent Institutionally Disruptive Companies have become increasingly visible and debated within political and legal arenas. While a retreat to the shadows remains possible for some, nongovernmental organizations as well as governments are increasingly monitoring and sanctioning the operations of Institutionally Disruptive Companies. Additionally, violence has taken on a key role within some contexts, especially where it has the support of the people and is legitimate. A significant contribution that my dissertation could provide to these debates is to explicate how and why increasingly illegitimate or unsustainable strategies on one side may legitimate violence, noncompliance, or legal sanction on the other, thus incentivizing restraint, compromise, and relative transparency on both sides. My past fieldwork experience has involved such delicate subjects, including traditional justice systems in Latin America as well as community natural resource management in East Africa.

Thus, the overall dissertation will include a study of the design of Institutionally Disruptive Products, their deployment by Institutionally Disruptive Companies, as well as the responses of political, legal, and social actors. The knowledge that the dissertation will generate will inform the design of public policies as well as the legal and political aspects of Institutionally Disruptive Companies' business strategies. The knowledge generated may also inform the activities of nonprofit organizations, social movements, as well as other social actors that play key roles within the interactions between Institutionally Disruptive Companies, the state, and society. Additionally, social impact organizations might similarly benefit from the knowledge of how to launch products that may provide social benefits, but that would experience political and legal opposition.

The Broader Impacts

The broader impacts of the project will include the specification of a conceptual and theoretical framework that will orient readers to view the challenges and opportunities presented by Institutionally Disruptive Technologies, companies, and products in a new light. Rather than preserving an idealized vision of the present or past, embracing these technologies represents an opportunity to realize new visions or to enhance progress toward extant visions. These visions may include reductions in inequality, increases in environmental sustainability, as well as increased access to leisure time and the ability to pursue one's passions. Alternatively, Institutionally Disruptive Technologies may be deployed to counter the above socially desirable goals, either intentionally or through their externalities. Political and legal considerations are key to the shaping of the future. Will the future be shaped by companies engaging rapid strategies in the shadows or will citizens, their representatives, as well as other democratic institutions play a role in constraining, directing, and enabling the shaping of the future? The flip side of the coin, however, is that panic may lead to staunch conservatism at the expense of utilizing these technologies to improve psychological and material conditions within modern society. My goal in my dissertation is to produce an interrelated set of empirically tested theoretical models complemented with a philosophical reflection on the results of the studies. These theories as well as this reflection will also be in conversation with others who are currently grappling with these issues.

Within STS the project will highlight a key means through which emerging technologies as well as those that have achieved increased legitimacy through scientific testing may be introduced by companies while accounting for the political and legal hurdles to their successful establishment.

The dissertation will also contribute to debates about the role of governments, citizens, and democratic politics in the shaping of the future. Within Political Science, theories of institutional strength have emphasized the stability, significance, and compliance inducing properties of institutions (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009; Brinks, Levitsky, and Murillo 2019.) However, the dynamic political and economic incentives induced by more rapid technological development require that political actors seeking to achieve compliance, maintain relative stability, and maintain significant institutions must integrate new technologies, channel technological development, and navigate the pressures that it introduces for institutional change. Relative stability as well as achieving significant impact may also involve harnessing these technological developments in order to strengthen institutions or advance further towards the goals of institutional designers. The dissertation will contribute to debates regarding institutional design and strength through considering how institutional designers and power holders respond to the challenges posed by Institutionally Disruptive Companies amidst an era of increasingly rapid technological change.

There are many opportunities as well as many challenges that Institutionally Disruptive Technologies present to society. Politics, law, and the choices that individuals make impact how they and the technologies that they introduce will shape the future of human societies. The book that I will write aims to provide a fruitful perspective for prospective entrepreneurs, social activists, institutional designers, state actors such as legislators or regulators, as well as citizens to consider the role that they ought to play in this process. Numerous authors have written about these challenges, including work focused on data and privacy concerns as well as issues of inequality and workers' rights. The presentation of the strategic logic that guides an Institutionally Disruptive Company will provide a novel intervention into these debates while also presenting the issues in a comprehensive and accessible fashion that may expand the debate to incorporate more individuals into the process of imagining and shaping the future.

I have pursued activities as well as shared my research with diverse audiences in the past with the goal of advancing positive social change, as mentioned within the synergistic activities section of my biographical sketch. Additionally, I am a talented writer. The financial support of the NSF STS section will enable me to publish articles as well as a nonfiction book with the goal of reaching an even broader audience in an engaging and thought-provoking manner.

Conclusion

The model illuminates constraints faced by the leaders of Institutionally Disruptive Companies. These constraints ought to be considered by those seeking to regulate them in order to achieve their regulatory goals if the results of the tests support the implications of the model. The model specifically predicts that a company is unlikely to comply if it or its product experiences high levels of support within the population as well as if there is a significant competitive threat were it to comply. Yet, there are also mechanisms through which political and economic actors may impact these decisions, such as through enforcement or violence. The component presented in this proposal will focus on the role of brand dominance and intellectual property security in compliance decisions. However, it will also be intimately linked with the other components of the dissertation, one of which examines the use of political and economic violence as well as variation in the successful use of such violence as a competitive tactic to counter Institutionally Disruptive Companies. An additional component may include a survey experiment that will provide an

opportunity to test whether variable levels of uncertainty impact the risk tolerance of individuals within these types of business decision making environments.

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